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I. FACTS

Respondent, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd. (NCL), operates cruise
ships' that depart from and return to U.S. ports,2 while sailing under the
flags of foreign nations.3 Having purchased round-trip vacations aboard
* B.A. Brandeis University, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa; J.D. University of Florida,
Levin College of Law, cum laude. The author is currently a litigation associate at the law firm of
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Alexrod, LLP in Miami, Florida.
1. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 126 (2005). Cruise ships of the
like operated by Respondent are often referred to as "floating resorts" in that they provide
passengers with a truly all-inclusive vacation. Id. Lodging, food, entertainment, and amenities are
all provided for the duration of the voyage. Id,
2. NCL is a Bermuda Corporation headquartered in Miami, Florida. Id. NCL for all intents
and purposes functions as an American business enterprise, carrying predominantly American
passengers. Id. In industry terms, of the approximately 10 million cruise ship passengers in 2004,
U.S. residents accounted for 3 of every 4 passengers. Warren Richey, FightOver Making Ships Fit
for the Disabled, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2005, at 3. Furthermore, the terms and
conditions of NCL tickets mandate the operation of U.S. law in the event disputes arise between
the operator and passengers. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. In addition, in efforts to solicit business and
increase sales, NCL heavily advertises in the U.S. market. Id.
3. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. The practice of sailing under flags of convenience is customary
in the cruise ship industry. See LEX FRIEDEN, NATIONAL CouNCIL ON DISABIITY, ABSTRACT:
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Respondent's ships,4 Petitioners, disabled Americans and their
companions, filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas against Respondent.5 Citing violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 6 Petitioners claimed that title 111 of the
Act requires Respondent to accommodate the disabled and their traveling
companions by making "reasonable modifications to policies, practices,
or procedures," 7 and to remove "architectural barriers"' from their ships
when such removal is "readily achievable." 9
Finding title I to apply to foreign-flagged cruise vessels as a general
matter, the trial court nevertheless granted Respondent's motion to dismiss
the claims for physical barrier removal.'l The Court of Appeals then

ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
PERSONS wrrH DIsAmLITIEs (2005), http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/ publications/2005/spector
norwegian.htm#Conclusion (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). For most operators, avoiding registration
in the United States is primarily a tactical business decision. Id. Beyond complying with U.S.
environmental regulations and labor laws, in order to fly under the American flag, the registrant
must ensure that at least three-quarters of the vessel's crew, including the master and chief
engineer, are U.S. citizens. Id. In addition, factors such as tax incentives and the absence of
minimum wage laws make nations such as the Bahamas a more attractive alternative. Id.
4. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. The two vessels with which the Petitioners took issue, the
Norwegian Star and the Norwegian Sea, both departed from Houston, Texas and were registered
in the Bahamas. Id.
5. Id. Petitioners filed a class action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated. Id.
6. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12184(a) (1990). The ADA
generally prohibits discrimination based on disabilities in places of "public accommodation" and
"specified public transportation services." Spector,545 U.S. at 26; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a)
(1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12184(a) (1990).
7. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126-27; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1990). Title III
does not compel such modifications if the servicing entity can show that fulfilling these
requirements would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the goods or services provided. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1990).
8. Spector, 545 U.S. at 127; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1990).
9. Spector, 545 U.S. at 127; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1990); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12184(b)(2)(C) (1990). Title III defines readily achievable as "able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(9) (1990). Therefore, the statute seems to be
indicating that both financial and practical viability factors should be considered when determining
if a given change is required under title III. See 42 U.S.C.A. §12181(9)(A)-(D) (1990); see also
Spector, 545 U.S. at 135.
10. Spector, 545 U.S. at 127. Because the agencies charged with providing architectural
guidelines had yet to do so for cruise ships at the time oftrial, the district court found modifications
to be unclear, and hence would not allow these claims to proceed. Id. These agencies eventually
drafted and distributed guidelines in November 2004, approximately three months before the Court
ruled. Id. at 128. Nevertheless, these proposals were never considered as they had no bearing on
the legal question before the Court. Id.
SPECTOR V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.-BACKGROUND, LEGAL
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affirmed in part and reversed in part," finding title I1of the ADA to be a
general statute wholly inapplicable to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S.
waters 12 absent a clear statement of congressional intent. 3 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, had previously held to the contrary. 4 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 5 Reversing the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings and HELD that foreign-flagged cruise ships must comply with
title III of the ADA when in U.S. waters, except in situations where such
adherence to the statute would interfere with a vessel's internal affairs. 6
II. HISTORY
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidlago, S.A. serves as the seminal case
defining American legal jurisdiction with regard to foreign-flagged ships
temporarily in U.S. waters. 17 When the vessel" in Benz docked near
Portland, Oregon, 9 its crew,2 ° of which not a single American was a
member, went on strike.2 ' In the months following the strike, crew
members and their representatives organized various peaceful picket-line

11. Id. at 127. Before any true discovery could be conducted, the appellate court dismissed
the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Id. at 128.
12. Id. at 125, 128. Employing a literal reading of the definitional statute, the Fifth Circuit
failed to find cruise ships, let alone foreign-flag cruise ships, among the forums specifically deemed
by title III to fall under its statutory supervision. Id. Section 12181(7) of title III provides a litany
of examples of private entities that do qualify, including hotels, restaurants, museums, zoos,
nurseries, gymnasiums, and bowling alleys; however, the section fails to explicitly mention cruise
ships. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (1990); see also Spector, 545 U.S. at 127-28.
13. Spector, 545 U.S. at 127 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S.
138, 147 (1957)); see also McCulloch v. SociedadNacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10(1963).
14. Spector, 545 U.S. at 125; see also Stevens v. Premier Cruise, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1243
(2000) (ruling that the ADA does, in fact, apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S waters).
15. Spector, 545 U.S. at 125.
16. Id. at 142.
17. See Benz, 353 U.S. at 138.
18. The ship was Panamanian-owned and sailed under a Liberian flag. Id. at 139.
19. The ship stopped for repairs, to load cargo, and to complete an insurance survey. Id.
20. The ship's crew, composed primarily of Germans and Britons, had previously agreed to
serve two-year tenures until the ship returned to Germany. Id. They also agreed to obey the
commands of the Master of the Riviera when on board, in boats, or on shore. Id.
21. Id. Refusing to follow the commands of the Master, the crew demanded higher wages,
better conditions, and a reduction in their terms of service before returning to work. Id. at 139-40.
Discharging the entire crew, the Master ordered them to leave the ship. Id. at 140.
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protests.22 The respondent sought injunctive relief and money damages; the
district cour 3 awarded both.24 Citing the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) as controlling, the unions argued that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the case. 25 Rejecting this claim, the trial court ruled that
the LMRA is only concerned with governing the relations between
American workers and their American employers. 26 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.27
Agreeing that the LMRA was not controlling, the Court highlighted
that, aside from the fact that the controversy ignited while the ship was in
U.S. waters, the conflict had absolutely no American connection.28
Qualifying the general rule that a ship is presumed to be under the law of
the nation into whose waters it voluntarily sails, 29 the Court acknowledged
that there may be instances where a local sovereign would decline to
exercise its full jurisdiction.30 Finding this to be such an instance, the Court
affirmed, declining to interfere in the "delicate field of international
relations," without a "clearly expressed" intention from Congress.3
22. Benz, 353 U.S. at 140. The Sailor's Union of the Pacific, the organization the crew
designated as their collective bargaining representative, picketed until restrained by an injunction.
Id. Days later, the National Organization of Master, Mates, and Pilots ofAmerica organized another
picket line that was again quelled by an injunction. Id.The Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, S.I.U.,
picked up where the previous organizations left off and managed to establish yet another picket
line; they too were silenced by an injunction filed by the respondent. Id. at 140-41.
23. The appellate court had dismissed the injunctive claims as moot after the ship sailed. Id.
at 141. The remaining damages claims were remanded to the district court for trial. Id.
24. Id. Because of the strike, repairmen and cargo loaders refused to cross the picket line. Id.
As a result, the respondent's ship was forced to sit idle. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Hence, the Act was inapt for resolving disputes between a foreign ship and its foreign
crew. Id.
27. Benz, 353 U.S. at 142.
28. Id. Acknowledging the issue as one of congressional intent, the Court saw no indication
in the legislative history to indicate that the legislature intended the Act to regulate foreign labor
disputes. Id. at 142-43. Noting that the coauthor of the bill, Chairman Hartley, consistently referred
to the Act as one crafted for "American workingmen," the Court deduced that the idea of extending
the coverage of the Act to situations like the one at issue "appears not to have even occurred to
those sponsoring the bill." Id. at 144.
29. Id. at 142 (citing Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887)).
30. Id. Describing the exercise ofjurisdiction by the local power as discretionary rather than
mandatory, the Court envisioned instances when, taking public policy reasons into account, it might
behoove a local sovereign to exercise limited jurisdiction or none at all. Id. (citing Cunard S.S. Co.
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923)).
31. Id. at 147. Six years later, in McCulloch, the Court once again found the operations of
foreign-flag ships employing foreign labor to be beyond the coverage of the NLRA. McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 13 (1963). Relying on its reasoning in
Benz, the Court agreed with the district court that the Act did not apply due to a lack of any specific
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With InternationalLongshoremen'sLocal 1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., the Court expanded its jurisdictional paradigm.32 Revisiting
the scope of the NLRA, this time with respect to American longshoremen,
the Court found foreign-flagged vessels subject to the NLRA's
requirements.33 The litigation involved two cruise ships serviced by
American workers when docked in Florida.34 When labor organizations
representing the American longshoremen organized pickets protesting the
workers substandard wages,3" the respondents procured temporary, and
eventually permanent,36 injunctive relief from the Circuit Court.3 7 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida declined review.38 The Court granted
certiorari39 and reversed.4 ° Reasoning that Congress would have intended
for the NLRA to apply to situations where American employees took issue
with their foreign employers, the Court distinguished Benz.4 Anticipating

language of congressional intent. Id. at 21-22. The petitioners, the NLRA Board, argued that their
case was distinguishable, since unlike Benz, which involved a single ship temporarily in American
waters, McCulloch involved a fleet of ships that were in constant routes too and from the United
States. Id. at 18-19. Furthermore, the petitioners relied on the fact that the foreign owners were
ultimately controlled by an American corporation, and, therefore, the American contacts were
greater than in Benz. Id. Fearing that interference with a foreign ship's "internal discipline and
order" would lead to disturbances in international relations, the Court was primarily concerned with
the real possibility of a "head-on collision" with Honduran labor law. Id. at 19-21; see also Spector
v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., 545 U.S 119, 144 (2005). Viewing that potential conflict as a
recipe for international discord, the Court declined to interpret a congressional act to conflict with
international law when another interpretation existed. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21; see also
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (holding that the act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains).
32. Int'l Longshoremen's Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 199200 (1970).
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id. at 196. One ship sailed under a Panamanian flag and the other a Liberian flag. Id. The
evidence showed that "outside labor," along with the ships' crew, would load cargo whenever the
ship berthed at Port Everglades or Miami. Id.
35. Id. at 196-97. Picketers carrying signs and distributing literature gathered in front of the
area in which passengers embarked and disembarked. Id. at 197 n. 1.
36. Id. at 197. Following the appellate court's affirming decision, the circuit court made the
injunction permanent, and the appellate court affirmed again. Id.
37. Longshoremen, 379 U.S. at 197.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 196.
40. Id. at 201.

41. Id. at 199 (distinguishing McCulloch as well).
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no conflict with international or foreign law,42 the Court saw no harm in
asserting U.S. jurisdiction." 3
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Court took the
opportunity to refine its definition of international comity for the purposes
of applying domestic law to foreign entities." The Harford plaintiffs
brought suit against domestic and foreign insurance companies, alleging
various antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.45 The plaintiffs claimed
the defendants were engaging in conspiracies in efforts to affect the
American insurance market.' The defendants claimed antitrust immunity
under the McCarran-Furguson Act.4 7 Reversing the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendants could not claim immunity under the Act.4 8
The appellate court went on to find that exercise of the Sherman Act over
the foreign defendants49 was not, in fact, barred by principles of
international comity."
Granting certiorari, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.5 '
42. Longshoremen, 379 U.S. at 200. The Court found the longshoremen's casual, short-term,
and irregular contributions to be inconsistent with any involvement with the foreign ships' "internal
discipline and order." Id.
43. Id.
44. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
45. Id. at 769; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1992).
46. Hartford,509 U.S. at 769.
47. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1992).
48. Hartford,509 U.S. at 778-79. Section 2(b) ofthe McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts from
federal regulation "the business of insurance," except "to the extent that such business is not
regulated by state law." Id. at 780. The appellate court acknowledges that the boycott exemption
was potentially applicable since the defendants were engaged in the "business of insurance." Id.
at 779. However, the appellate court found that the defendants were ineligible to enjoy its
protection because they had acted with foreign insurers who were not governed by state law. Id.
49. The London reinsurers had allegedly conspired to get primary insurers in the United
States to offer commercial general liability (CGL) coverage on a "claims-made basis," which
resulted in the unavailability of CGL coverage for many insured in California. Id. at 770-71, 795.
In addition, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants conspired to limit coverage of pollution risks and
property contamination in North America, making those particular types of insurance virtually
unavailable in California. Id. at 795.
50. Id. at 779. Siding with the defendants, the appellate court believed "application of
[American] antitrust laws to the London reinsurance market 'would lead to significant conflict with
English law and policy,"' and that "such a conflict, unless outweighed by other factors, would by
itself be reason to decline exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 797-98; see also id. at 800 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); infra text accompanying note 54.

51. Hartford,509 U.S. at 779. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding in so far
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With respect to the question of whether the scope of Sherman Act
jurisdiction reaches as far as the foreign defendants, the Court affirmed,
finding such action to be entirely appropriate.52 The Court reasoned that
since no direct conflict existed between domestic and foreign law,"
exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants would not offend
traditional notions of international comity. 4 Finding it well established
that "the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect" domestically,"
the Court held the foreign defendants to be within the Act's purview.5 6 The
Court made it evident that international comity concerns should only be
considered, if at all, "after a court has determined that the acts complained
as the defendants were not generally entitled to immunity under the Act; however, the Court
declined to find the defendants to have been deprived of protection under the boycott exception
simply due to their contacts with foreign insurers. Id.at 784.
52. Id. at 794-96; see also supra text accompanying note 49.
53. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798-99. The foreign defendants did not argue that British law
requires them to act in some way contrary to American law. Id.at 799. Therefore, the Court
reasoned that it is quite possible for the foreign defendants to comply with both sets of laws
simultaneously. Id.The Court went on to hold that it does not follow that because some conduct
is lawful in one nation, the application of American antitrust laws is barred. Id (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403, cmt. e). Quite to the contrary, the Court
refused to acknowledge a conflict "where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both." Id.
54. Id.
at 798. The appellate court acknowledged that if other factors existed that outweighed
a conflict with English law, they would be enough to justify the exercise ofjurisdiction. See supra
text accompanying note 50. Finding the London reinsurers' intentional interference with U.S.
markets to be one such mitigating factor, the appellate court found Sherman Act jurisdiction
appropriate despite the potential conflict. Hartford,509 U.S. at 797-98. In justifying the appellate
court's holding, the Court reasoned that Congress had never expressly required a court to decline
Sherman Act jurisdiction based solely on international comity concerns. Id.at 798. Instead,
jurisdictional issues should be resolved before consulting the international comity doctrine. Id.
Conceding the well established tenet that the Sherman Act does apply extraterritorially despite its
"boilerplate language," the dissent finds that even in situations where the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been overcome, domestic statutes cannot fairly be read in such a way as to
interfere with international comity concerns. See id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)); id. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). In an effort to clarify his definition of international
comity, Justice Scalia utilizes the more descriptive term "prescriptive comity." Hartford,509 U.S.
at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Defining this term as "the respect sovereign nations afford each other
by limiting the reach of their laws," the dissent envisions this inquiry as one to be answered
contemporaneously with the question of statutory reach. Id.at 815-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 797 n.24.
55. Hartford,509 U.S. at 796 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)).
56. Id. at 796. The London reinsurers' unlawful behavior was intentional and produced
substantial detrimental effects domestically. Id.
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of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction."57
III.

INSTANT CASE

With the instant case, the Court asserted the supremacy of American
law over foreign cruise ships that fail to comply with ADA regulations
while in U.S. waters.5" The Court reasoned that although cruise ships are
not explicitly mentioned in title 1I, it is clear that Congress intended to
include these vessels under either "public accommodation" or "public
transportation."59
Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit's sweeping application" of the Clear Statement Rule to title III
legislation.6' Agreeing with the appellate court that a clear statement from
Congress is necessary before a general statute such as title HI could
interfere with a foreign-flagged ship's internal affairs,62 the Court declined

57. Id. at 797 n.24. The dissent argues that principles of international comity should be a
factor used to determine if Sherman Actjurisdiction exists. Seeid. at 817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also supra text accompanying note 54. The Court rejected this argument as inconsistent with
the general rule that the Sherman Act governs any foreign conduct that negatively impacts the
United States. Hartford,509 U.S. at 795, 798; see also United States v. Aluminum Co ofAm., 148
F.2d 416, 444 (1945).
58. See Spector V. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 142 (2005).
59. Id. at 129; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181(7), 12182, 12184. The Court felt that
employing reasonable methods of interpretation would undoubtedly lead to that result. Spector, 545
U.S. at 129; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
60. Spector,545 U.S. at 132. Finding the Fifth Circuit's interpretation ofthe Clear Statement
Rule to be overly broad, the Court recognized that denying such a large number of handicapped
individuals the right to enjoy cruises would be a harsh interpretation of a statute implemented to
protect the disabled. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 103. Furthermore, the Court warned
of the possibility that, had the appellate court's reasoning prevailed, its decision would pave the
way for other general statues such as the Civil Rights statutes to be unavailable aboard foreign-flag
cruise ships. Spector, 545 U.S. at 132. The Court found this result to be inconsistent with
congressional intent. Id.
61. Spector, 545 U.S. at 129-30. The Court characterized the Clear Statement Rule as a
narrow exception to the general rule that the laws of the United States are presumed to apply to
foreign-flag ships in U.S. waters if the interests of U.S. citizens, rather than the interests internal
to the ship, are at stake. Id. at 130; see also Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 127 (1923);
Uravic v. R. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 240 (1931).
62. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130. Basing its interpretation of the rule on accepted principles of
international comity, the Court reasoned that when matters arise on board that concern only the
vessel itself or a foreign state, Congress would not have intended to interfere; hence, such issues
should be governed by the laws of the flag state. Id. (citing Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1,12
(1887)). In contrast however, "[i]f crimes are committed on board [a foreign-flagged vessel] of a
character to disturb the peace and tranquility of the country to which the vessel has been brought,
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to go any further.6 3 Reviewing the Petitioners' extensive list of
allegations,' 4 the Court determined that, with regard to the majority of the
ADA conditions at issue, requiring compliance would have no impact on
a ship's internal affairs.65 However, the Court found that at least one such
requirement, namely the removal of physical barriers
to access, 66 could
67
effect.
an
such
have
to
reasonably be interpreted
Recognizing that title Il imposes several significant self-limitations on
its own scope,68 the Court acknowledged situations in which the statute
itself would make resort to physical alterations unnecessary. 69 Applying
the offenders have never by comity or usage been entitled to any exemption from the operation of
the local laws." Id.at 131 (citing Wildenhus, 120 U.S. at 12); see also Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963).
63. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 142. Acknowledging situations in which an imposed regulation
would have no impact whatsoever on the ship's internal affairs, the Court reasoned that application
of the Clear Statement Rule would be unnecessary in those instances. Id. at 133.
64. Id.at 133-34. Among Petitioners' allegations were claims that Respondent charged them
higher fares, made them pay special surcharges, and located evacuation programs and equipment
in areas inaccessible to disabled individuals. Id.Furthermore, the disabled passengers were required
to waive any potential medical liability and made to travel with a companion. Id.Respondent
reserved the right to remove from the ship at any time disabled passengers "whose presence
endangers the comfort of other passengers .. " Id. Petitioners also broadly claimed that
Respondent failed to make reasonable modifications to its policies and procedures necessary to
ensure the Petitioners' full enjoyment of the services offered. Spector, 545 U.S. at 134.
65. Id.Refusing to consider the merits of these claims individually, the Court simply ruled
that, in the event these allegations are proven at trial, a court's order mandating Respondent's
compliance would have no impact on the ship's internal order. Id.
66. Id.According to Petitioners, the most attractive cabins in the most sought after locations
were not handicapped accessible. Id.Furthermore, Petitioners pointed to the ships coamings-the
raised edges around doors-as a physical barrier to access since they made it difficult for people
with wheelchairs and scooters to negotiate many areas of the ship. Id.
67. Id.
at 134-35. Finding it impossible to achieve Petitioner's demands without permanently
altering the ship's core design by means of significant construction efforts, the Court interpreted
this as a likely interference with the ship's internal affairs. Id.The Court did admit that the term
"internal affairs" is ambiguous and therefore difficult to define with precision. Id.at 133. Declining
to tackle the definitional task head on, the Court chose to use conventional perceptions of
international comity as a guide for determining when the Clear Statement Rule should be activated.
Id.The Court indicated that whether or not title III would have required these physical barrier
removals under its terms is still left unresolved. Id.at 135.
68. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 129.
69. See id.at 135-36; see also supra text accompanying note 9. If potential structural
modifications, for example, were found to be beyond what is readily achievable, then title III itself
would pardon the entity from making any changes despite any discriminatory effects that might
result from maintaining the status quo. Spector, 545 U.S. at 135-36. For example, if the
modifications were not "easily accomplishable" or unable to be carried out "without much
difficultly or expense," then the alteration would not be considered readily achievable. Id.at 135;
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this reasoning to the facts at issue in the instant case, the Court found it a
distinct possibility that title III does not require the structural alterations
Petitioners demanded;70 if this were the case, the Court theorized, resort to
the Clear Statement Rule would be unnecessary.71
Justice Kennedy then proceeded to recommend a judicial course of
action in situations where determining the precise meaning of "readily
achievable" proves to be a formidable undertaking.72 In those instances,
the plurality held that it may be prudent for a court to turn to the Clear
Statement Rule first, before delving into the daunting task of determining
73
exactly what the general statute does and does not require by its terms.

Having endorsed this case-by-case jurisprudence, the plurality found it
possible for the Clear Statement Rule to apply to one aspect of a general
statute such as the ADA while presumably leaving other elements
operative. 74 Accordingly, the Court left to the trial court on remand the
determination of whether to consult the Clear Statement Rule at the
outset.75
see also § 12181(9). In addition, the Court determined that if adherence to ADA-required
alterations would consequently cause a ship to fall into noncompliance with international standards
and obligations such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), then
that too would result in a failure to satisfy title III's definition of readily achievable. Spector, 545
U.S. at 135-36. If any of these scenarios were the case, the ADA would become inapplicable at the
inception, without any resort to the Clear Statement Rule. Id. at 137.
70. Spector, 545 U.S. at 136; see also supra text accompanying note 9. The Court reasons
that if title III itself did not take conflict with international law into account, an incongruous set of
circumstances would result. Spector, 545 U.S. at 136. American ships would be obligated to
comply with the ADA even if it would mean falling into noncompliance with SOLAS as a result,
whereas foreign ships which have the benefit of the Clear Statement Rule would not be so
obligated. Id.The Court concluded that Congress would not have intended this result. Id.; see also
Daniel Hoerner, Legal Talk: Foreign CruiseShips Sail Within Reach of ADA, LEGAL TALK, Sept.
12, 2005, at 15 (declaring "Spector is significant in that it brings foreign cruise ships in line with
their U.S. counterparts with respect to governance under ADA, at least insofar as their practices
affect concerns in the U.S.").
71. Spector, 545 U.S. at 137.
72. Id.
73. Id. The plurality goes on to characterize it as an "implied limitation" on an otherwise
unambiguous statute. Id. at 139; see generally Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). According to the plurality in the instant case, the rule operates as
a safety mechanism of sorts that restricts a general statue from operating in particularly sensitive
arenas that legislators might not have contemplated upon drafting. Spector, 545 U.S. at 139.
74. Spector, 545 U.S. at 139. Envisioning situations in which application of an entire statute
could be nullified due to the Clear Statement Rule's protection of one element, the Court held an
all-or-nothing application of the rule to be inequitable. Id.; but see id. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disapproving of a "section-by-section" dissection of general statutes and advocating an "acrossthe-board" application of the rule).
75. Id. at 142.
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IV. ANALYSIS

With the instant case, the Court took the opportunity to protect the
rights of disabled Americans, while making a concerted effort not to
infringe on commonly-held notions of international relations.76 However,
it quickly becomes apparent that the deeply divided Court has very
different interpretations as to what exactly qualifies as an undesired
disturbance to international comity." The dissent asserts that any potential
conflict with a ship's internal affairs is enough to jeopardize international
comity;78 hence, they demand nothing less than a clear directive from
Congress before applying American law under such circumstances. 79 On
the other end of the spectrum, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer view
international comity as less fragile, only necessitating clear congressional
assent when sound principles of international law are at peril.8 ° The
plurality holds ground somewhere in the middle, requiring less reassurance
than the cautious dissent, but more than the bold concurrence.81 Yet, in
order to achieve its balanced holding,82 the plurality expands the influence
of the Clear Statement Rule by recommending its application on a case-bycase basis.83
The plurality opinion begins to lose support,84 however, when it holds
that the Clear Statement Rule should always be consulted at the outset
when (1) it becomes difficult to determine whether the language of a
general statute implicates the foreign ship's conduct,85 and (2) the internal

76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 800 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 62.
79. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 149 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
80. See id.
at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also infra text accompanying note 86.
81. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 119.
82. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 16. The plurality bridges the gap by
finding that the ADA can be applied generally without disturbing international relations, yet pulling
back with regards to permanent physical alterations that could potentially interfere with the vessel's
internal affairs. Spector, 545 U.S. at 134-35; see also supra text accompanying note 74.
83. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 138; see also id. at 155-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying note 74.
84. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 136-37; see alsosupra text accompanying note 73. In the instant case, the difficulty
lies in pinpointing the intended definition of "readily achievable." See Spector, 545 U.S. at 135.
The Court begins a discussion as to the possible interpretations of the term, but instead of
culminating its discussion with a definitive resolution, it retreats and turns to an easier alternative:
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affairs of the foreign ship could potentially be compromised.86 With the
instant case, such a perfect storm of circumstances arises. However, the
plurality is only able to endorse this course of action after
mischaracterizing the main objective underlying the Clear Statement
Rule;87 the rule is more broadly concerned with preventing domestic law
from conflicting with international law, not simply safeguarding a ship's
internal affairs.88
Moreover, with this portion of its holding, the plurality overlooks the
real danger implicit in consulting the Clear Statement Rule first, while
leaving the interpretation of the underlying statute for another day.8 9 By
allowing the trial court on remand to skip straight to the Clear Statement
Rule and pass on determining whether the barrier removal asked for by
Petitioners is, in fact, readily achievable, a situation arises in which ADA
requirements will never be well defined.9" By attempting to appease
principles of international comity first, the Court puts the cart before the
horse; it is impractical to determine if implementation of domestic law on

application of the Clear Statement Rule. Id. at 135-37.
86. Spector, 545 U.S. at 137. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer find themselves unable to concur
as to this point, disagreeing with the plurality's promotion of the Clear Statement Rule as the
controlling doctrine under these circumstances. See id. at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
However, the concurrence makes it clear that in situations where the Clear Statement Rule is
operative, they would endorse the plurality's application-by-application use of the rule. Id. at 143
n. 1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 21-22 (1963); Benz v. CompaniaNaviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957); supra
text accompanying notes 54, 57.
88. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg provides a
needed reminder of the historical underpinnings that gave rise to the Clear Statement Rule,
specifically, that domestic statutes should not be imposed on foreign entities if the regulations
conflict with international law. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Hartford,509 U.S. at
815 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Finding title III of the ADA when "properly read" to avoid such
conflict with international law, the concurrence finds the plurality's application of the Clear
Statement Rule to title III to be unnecessary and therefore erroneous. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 9.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 57.
90. Since the Court declined to decide the merits of the case based on the language of the
statute itself, citizens can never be satisfied that the law is sufficient. If, for example, the Court had
ruled that the physical modifications asked for by Petitioners were beyond title III's definition of
readily achievable, citizens dissatisfied with the Court's holding could petition their congressmen
to amend the law. However, since the Court failed to take a decisive stance as to what "readily
achievable" means and decided the case in spite of it, voters are deprived of any potential recourse
via the political process.
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foreign entities violates international comity without first determining
exactly what the domestic law requires on its face. 9'
Recognizing this pitfall in the plurality's reasoning, the concurrence
underscores the remainder of its brethren's misplaced preoccupation with
arriving at a decision aimed at international noninterference vis-A-vis the
internal affairs rule.92 The guidance of Benz, McCulloch, and Hartford
suggest that the instant Court should be implementing a more general test
focused primarily on conflicts with international law.93 In reaching its
holding, the Benz Court is chiefly concerned with avoiding "international
discord" and the certainty of "retaliative action."94 Furthermore, unlike the
factual circumstances in McCulloch, applying title HI to foreign-flagged
ships is unlikely to result in direct conflict with the regulations of the flag
state or international obligations.95
Given the distinct possibility that the Court's underlying
noninterference objectives articulated in Benz and McCulloch are satisfied
by the language of title III itself,96 mixing the internal affairs rule into the
analysis becomes superfluous.97 The plurality "cuts the rule loose from its
foundation" by giving it an additional function in situations where a ship's
internal affairs are potentially compromised, yet where modifications
might be both readily achievable and not in conflict with international
obligations.9" Assuming the intended purpose of the Clear Statement Rule
91. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 797-99; see also supra text accompanying notes 54 & 57.
92. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 142-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 799; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
146-47 (1957); supra text accompanying notes 31, 54 & 57.
94. Benz, 353 U.S. at 147; see also supratext accompanying note 31. Justice Ginsburg points
out that nowhere in the Benz decision does the Court "resort to the tag, 'internal affairs' rule, to
explain the Court's decision." Spector, 545 U.S. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
95. Acknowledging that the "internal affairs" terminology was alive and well in McCulloch,
the concurrence distinguishes the application of the internal affairs rule in that instance by pointing
to the "'head-on collision' with the regulatory regime installed under the Honduran labor code."
Spector, 545 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Int'l Longshoremen's Local 1416,
AFL-CI0 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1970) (reasoning that, absent conflict
with international law, U.S. law should apply when U.S. citizens are affected). The lack of a direct
conflict with international law is evidenced most vividly by NCL's willingness to completely
submit to ADA regulations. Even before the instant Court issued its ruling, NCL reported that one
of the vessels in question had been decommissioned and the other was slated to be taken out of
service within months. Linda Greenhouse, DisabledCruisePassengersAskfor Justices 'Protection,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at A15.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 9 & 69-70.
97. The concurrence finds "no larger space for the internal affairs rule." Spector, 545 U.S.
at 144 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 145 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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is to avoid international discord, there is no basis for attaching greater
import to a ship's internal affairs when international harmony is not at
risk99 and good reason exists for asserting domestic law. 0 It then follows
that if no such international obligations subsist, no practical rationale
remains to demand an explicitly clear go-ahead from Congress before
granting Americans relief under a law crafted for their benefit and
protection.101

V. CONCLUSION

With the instant case, the plurality attempts to accommodate
Americans with disabilities, foreign cruise ship operators, and the
international community with one fell swoop.' °2 Not surprisingly, an
overly safe decision ensues. The Court ultimately reaches a progressive,

99. The concurrence cannot foresee that application of title III would generate a "storm of
diplomatic protest." Id. at 145 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). In
hindsight, it is clear that the concurrence's prediction accurately reflected the reality of the
situation. NCL has since demonstrated its complete willingness to comply with ADA regulations.
An NCL spokesman has boasted that their newest ships contain "electric hoists that lift someone
out of a wheelchair and place them in a swimming pool or Jacuzzi." Warren Richey, Fight Over
Making Ships Fitfor the Disabled,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 2005, at 3. The spokesman further
declared, "I don't know of a single hotel where you could find such facilities." Id. This proactive
stance is, if nothing else, a careful business decision. "The industry has decided there is no
economic downside to making the vessel more ADA compliant in competing for a very large
market of people with disabilities." Id. As a result, the vast majority of new ships being built today
are designed with disabled passengers in mind. Id.
100. See supranote 2; supratext accompanying notes 61-62. As the concurrence in the instant
case noted, when no conflict exists "and there is good reason to apply our own law, asserted
internal affairs of a ship should hold no greater sway than asserted management prerogatives of a
landlocked enterprise." Spector, 545 U.S. at 145 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
101. Spector, 545 U.S. at 145 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying
note 42; Int'l Longshoremen's Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 196,
199-200 (1970) (finding implementation of domestic law appropriate when the rights of American
citizens are at stake and no international conflict exists).
102. Representatives from both sides seemed to be able to find a bright side. NCL lawyer
David C. Frederick was quoted as saying that the Court had issued a "very favorable ruling that will
ensure [NCL] is not going to have to retrofit ships, which is the thing that most concerned the
industry." Charles Lane, Court Rules Ships Must Obey Laws on Disabled,WASH. POST, June 7,
2005, at A8. Thomas C. Goldstein, an attorney for the Petitioners, characterized the decision as "a
significant win" and was optimistic that "the ruling will lead to a requirement for accessible
bathrooms, temporary ramps and the like." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rules that
Disabilities Act, In Part, Applies to Foreign Cruise Ships, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/
07/politics/07scotus.htm?_r= I &oref=-slogin; Lane, supra, at A8.
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equitable outcome; °3 however, the ruling leaves important questions of
international legal jurisdiction unresolved. Although the instant case can
be viewed as a major step forward for handicapped cruisers," the deeply
divided Court takes two steps back by failing to fine-tune its definition of
international comity. Hiding behind the guise of the Clear Statement Rule
and misapplying the guidance of previous case law, the Court declines the
opportunity to send the strong signal to the international community
advocated by the concurring Justices-that absent a direct conflict with
international law, the United States is prepared to enforce its regulations
in all international circumstances where the rights of American citizens are
at stake. 0 5

103. The Court avoids the harsh repercussions for handicapped cruisers that would follow
from the interpretation advocated by the conservative dissent. See Spector,545 U.S. at 149 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 132. There is, after all, a large American handicapped cruising
population that has an interest in the outcome of the instant case. In fact, according to a recent
travel survey, 12% of people with disabilities had taken a cruise within the past five years,
compared to 8% of the non-disabled population. Greenhouse, supra note 102, at 6.
104. NCL has said that it welcomes the Court's ruling in the instant case and is "committed
to providing the most accessible ships in the cruise industry." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Rules That DisabilitiesAct, in Part,Applies to Foreign Cruise Ships, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005,
at A2 1; see also supra text accompanying note 99.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 3 & 103.
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